1.0 |
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Introduction: Childhood Ends, Sooner or Later |
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1.1 |
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The IT Industry Does Not Assume That Freedom From Liability Is a Given |
1.2 |
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Gaps in Information Liability Are Growing, Especially for Businesses |
1.3 |
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As the Costs of Failure Increase |
1.4 |
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IT Industry Immunity From Liability Will End: The Question Is How |
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2.0 |
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IT Vendors Are Free From Nearly All Liability |
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2.1 |
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In the U.S., Technology Users, Not Producers, Are Regulated |
2.2 |
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U.S. IT Vendors Dominate in Software Liability and Warranty |
2.3 |
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Vendor Negotiating Positions Have Weakened Slightly, but Only for Large Customers |
2.4 |
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EU Regulation Is Consumer and Antitrust-Oriented |
2.5 |
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EU Data Collectors Are at Risk; Software Producers Are Not |
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3.0 |
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Strong Drivers to Change Are Present |
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3.1 |
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The Chase Curve Describes the Life Cycle of a Public Policy Issue |
3.2 |
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We Are Well Along the Chase Curve Where Privacy Is Concerned |
3.3 |
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A Dangerous Condition: Technology Is Ubiquitous and Quality Remains an Issue |
3.4 |
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Impact, if Not Frequency, of IT Failure Is Apparently Increasing |
3.5 |
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Software Is Applied to Problems It Was Not Designed to Solve |
3.6 |
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Crime Is Not the Main Issue |
3.7 |
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Other Destabilizing Forces Are Present |
3.8 |
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The Y2K Crisis Offers a Look Over the Brink |
3.9 |
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A Crisis Big Enough to Produce Change Is Imaginable, but Unpredictable |
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4.0 |
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Strong Inhibitors to Change Are Present |
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4.1 |
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Insulation of Consumers From Direct Effects of IT Is a Change Inhibitor |
4.2 |
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Regulation of Privacy Does Not Equal Regulation of Software |
4.3 |
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Courts Are an Inhibitor to Change in Enterprise Markets |
4.4 |
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The Installed Base Is an Inhibitor to Change in Enterprise Markets |
4.5 |
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Isolation Is an Inhibitor to Change in Enterprise Markets |
4.6 |
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Self-Regulation and Market Regulation Are Inhibitors to External Regulation |
4.7 |
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The Relative Harmlessness of Much Software Is an Inhibitor to External Regulation |
4.8 |
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Consumers Drive All |
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5.0 |
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Scenarios for Regulation and Liability |
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5.1 |
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The Status Quo Is Profitable for Industry Players, but Unlikely to Continue |
5.2 |
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Full-On Regulation Is Complex |
5.3 |
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Full-On Regulation Is Unlikely Barring Utter Disaster — And Even With It |
5.4 |
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Targeted Regulation — Internal and External — Is the Likeliest Scenario |
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6.0 |
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Features of a Targeted Regulation Model for the IT Industry |
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6.1 |
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Industry Self-Regulation Is an Effective Solution for Most Aspects of the Model |
6.2 |
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The Targeted Model Creates Markets for Vendors |
6.3 |
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The Targeted Model Creates Opportunities and Liabilities for Enterprise Users |
6.4 |
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The Targeted Model Will Raise Awareness of IT Constraints Among Consumers |
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7.0 |
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The Economic Impact of Targeted Regulation |
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7.1 |
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Software and Services Have a Nontrivial Impact on GDP |
7.2 |
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Software Sales and Marketing Practices Will Change — Completely |
7.3 |
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Software Development Costs and Processes Will Be Impacted — In the Long Term, Favorably |
7.4 |
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Consolidation Increases — Within and Outside the IT Industry |
7.5 |
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Impacts on IT Services Providers Produce Big Winners and Big Losers |
7.6 |
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The Impact on the Open-Source Movement Is Uncertain and Potentially Deadly |
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8.0 |
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Gartner's Advice: Get Ready |
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8.1 |
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Software Vendors: Prepare for Transparency and Product Differentiation Based on Quality |
8.2 |
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Service Vendors: Do All the Above, And … |
8.3 |
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Enterprise Users: Demand Vendor Transparency, and Fix Your Own House |
8.4 |
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Conclusion: When Childhood Ends, Tools Replace Toys |
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